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A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE”
“CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE”:
REFLECTIONS IN LIGHT OF AN APPROACH TO CIL BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
Brian D. Lepard*
B.S. Chimni’s stimulating article1 makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on customary
international law (CIL) by examining CIL from the perspective of developing states, a perspective underrepresented in this literature. His article articulates well many valid points about the sociohistorical biases of CIL. At
the same time, there may be reasons for more optimism than Chimni appears to possess about the ability of CIL to
serve global interests, including those of the Third World. Furthermore, some of Chimni’s proposals merit further
reﬁnement. In this essay I propose to evaluate the strengths and potential shortcomings of Chimni’s arguments in
light of an approach to CIL that I have developed that is based on fundamental ethical principles recognized in
international law. After laying out an alternative theory that still has many resonances with Chimni’s proposals, I
discuss critically three of the key theses articulated by Chimni: First, that CIL is inherently colonialist and inconsistent with the values of Third World peoples; second, that even contemporary customary international human
rights law (IHRL) is a means of furthering global capitalism to the detriment of Third World peoples; and third,
that the remedy for CIL’s biases lies in the creation of a “postmodern” doctrine of CIL that incorporates reference
to the “juridical conscience of humankind.”
The Potential of a Theory of CIL Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles
Elsewhere I have proposed that CIL should be reconceptualized as an informal mode of lawmaking among
states that complements the more formal method of treaty-making.2 In short, I have suggested that a new CIL
norm emerges when “states generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative
legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain conduct.”3 This deﬁnition incorporates, in
effect, a more dynamic and forward-looking concept of opinio juris than the traditional one. Furthermore, according to my theory, state practice is one source of evidence that states believe a particular principle or rule is desirable,
but it is not the only source of evidence and it is not an essential precondition for the formation of a customary law
norm. In short, the revised deﬁnition of opinio juris is the “essence” of CIL.
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I have demonstrated that this conception of the evidentiary role of state practice and of opinio juris as the core
element of CIL is actually more consistent with the way that courts, and particularly the ICJ, have identiﬁed CIL
norms than the traditional “two-element” deﬁnition, especially in areas such as human rights.4 This is so even
though the two-element deﬁnition is widely recited, including in the Draft Conclusions recently adopted by the
International Law Commission.5
A critical element of the approach I have outlined is that the CIL norm-creation process, and the evaluation of
the status of particular norms as CIL, must be viewed within an ethical context. I have attempted to explicate this
context through the idea of “fundamental ethical principles” already endorsed by states and articulated in multilateral expressions of values, including the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
The foundational ethical principle anchoring this background ethical system is that of “unity in diversity,” which
maintains that states and peoples ethically ought to seek cooperation and unity, while respecting their cultural and
other differences.6 A related ethical principle, very relevant to the experience of Third World countries, is that of
signiﬁcant state autonomy and sovereign equality.7 Furthermore, a right to democracy is also a fundamental ethical
principle. Accordingly, I have argued that the process of CIL norm-recognition should indeed be more “democratic” in that it should (1) incorporate the views of all states in the global community, whether powerful or weak,
and rich or poor, including Third World states,8 and (2) give more weight to the views of states that take into
account, through elections or otherwise, the views of their people.9
One way in which my theory resonates with some Third World values is that it explicitly articulates an ethical
background system for evaluation of CIL grounded in the concept of unity in diversity. While all states can ﬁnd
roots of this concept in their religious and philosophical traditions, historically Third World peoples were more apt
to emphasize cooperation and unity over competition.10 We also ﬁnd in many Third World cultures, and especially
indigenous cultures, the practice of consultation among members of a tribal council or community members
aimed at creating a solution to community problems through open discussion and mutual learning. I have referred
to such a process as “open-minded consultation.”11 Chimni implicitly endorses such consultative values in all of
his proposals aimed at “democratizing” CIL and making it more pluralistic.
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See id. at 128–38.
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Is CIL Inherently Colonialist and Inconsistent with the Values of Third World Peoples?
Chimni’s central argument is that CIL has colonialist roots that have made it inimical to the interests and values
of Third World peoples. He thus afﬁrms that “the doctrine of CIL originated in nineteenth century Europe in the
period of the industrial revolution that saw the emergence of a shared legal consciousness and, in its second half,
high imperialism.”12 He notes that the “imperial order of the times meant that CIL played a key role in facilitating
the colonial project.”13 And he critiques even reformist versions of CIL that purport to be more universal, maintaining that the “essential aim of the ‘modern’ doctrine of CIL is the generation of norms that safeguard the systemic interests of the global capitalist system.”14
Let me ﬁrst explain how the approach to CIL I have proposed may validate many of Chimni’s points, while also
providing a way to alleviate some of his concerns. Most importantly, the approach does not preclude a critical
analysis of the adverse impact of particular CIL norms on Third World peoples. For example, there is no
doubt that many norms that at one time were accepted as CIL were blatantly designed to serve the economically
avaricious interests of Western powers. These include the doctrine of “conquest.” Thus, in 1823, Justice John
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court was able brazenly to declare in relation to U.S. government title over
Native American lands that “[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny. … The
title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force.”15
At the same time, while Western capitalist interests may have historically lobbied for recognition of certain
norms favorable to them as CIL, there is strong evidence that many norms today commonly accepted as CIL
do not uniformly beneﬁt these interests and may actually favor Third World states. For example, the ICJ has recognized as CIL the norm of a state’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources—a norm that clearly favors
resource-rich states (many of them Third World states) vis-à-vis transnational corporations (TNCs) and other
states that seek to exploit these resources unjustly.16 Thus, a fair assessment of whether recognized norms of
CIL favor Western states must be a mixed and nuanced one.
Stepping back from an examination of particular CIL norms, there are also reasons to doubt that CIL in theory
is inherently biased in favor of Western states. Chimni appears to suggest that CIL is wholly a creation of Western
imperialist powers. It may be true that if we take a limited view of CIL doctrine, focusing on accounts of it by
Western jurists, we might be led to make such an assumption. Yet viewed more broadly, there is nothing
“Western” about CIL, and indeed one might even consider it to be more “Third World” than Western in character.
This is because most Third World countries incorporate a domestic version of customary law in their legal systems
and scholars have in fact studied the great potential of domestic customary law to further sustainable
development.17
The idea that various practices among actors in a society may become legally binding through a shared belief
among members of that society that the practices should be legally binding is pervasive in Third World cultures.18
Indeed, prior to colonization these cultures tended to have informal lawmaking traditions based on this idea. Thus,
12
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it is not entirely accurate to state, as does Chimni, that it is “historical fact” that “the twin elements of state practice
and opinio juris that together constitute the ‘formal’ source of CIL were identiﬁed and given meaning in the context
of the relationship between European nations with a broadly shared culture.”19 That might be true at a doctrinal
level, but not at a substantive one. Third World societies also developed extensive customary laws governing their
mutual relations. This Third World-inspired CIL has been obscured by the Western bias in accounts of CIL that
have focused only on the behavior of Western countries. Fortunately, this situation is beginning to change.20
Is Customary IHRL a Means of Furthering Global Capitalism to the Detriment of Third World Peoples?
Chimni appears to suggest that even customary IHRL, which has sought to erase discrimination based on race,
ethnicity, nationality, and religion (discrimination that was a hallmark of imperialist policy), in reality serves to support the long-term functioning of Western neoimperialism and capitalism.21 He argues that new conceptions of
customary IHRL, rather than reversing this support, instead served to give the global capitalist system “a human
face at a time of aggressive exploitation of subaltern classes, nations, and nature so that this reality did not undermine its stability and legitimacy.”22
As noted above, we can acknowledge that certain CIL norms historically supported the interests of global capitalism, and in particular Western-based TNCs. However, it is doubtful that most norms of customary IHRL today
support these interests. On the contrary, the rise of IHRL has posed a serious challenge to all governments and to
TNCs. Post-UDHR treaty-based and customary IHRL also developed in symphony with the push for decolonization, as exempliﬁed by recognition of the right to self-determination in the very ﬁrst operative article of the two
1966 covenants on human rights.23
Many Western governments clearly disfavor emerging CIL norms such as those relating to the right to food and
to a sustainable environment. These norms threaten the existing social order in Western countries rather than
perpetuate it. Likewise, it is not at all clear that TNCs would wish to erect the current customary IHRL normative
order even to serve their long-term self-interests. There have been too many examples in recent decades of TNCs
exploiting workers and local populations, in violation of such customary law norms as the right to just and favorable conditions of work.24 In part because TNCs did not want to be legally bound by these norms, TNCs were very
skeptical about the United Nations’ attempts to impose them on TNCs in the so-called “Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights,” which were formulated by the former Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights in the early 2000s.25

19

Chimni, supra note 1, at 14.
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21
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Id. at 37.
23
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
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See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 23(1), GA Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
25
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In short, there is a fundamental tension between CIL human rights norms and corporate proﬁteering that
underscores the radical challenges posed by contemporary IHRL to both governments and TNCs. Moreover,
Chimni’s argument does not take into account that some TNCs may not only be motivated by proﬁt, but genuinely
seek to better the conditions of their workers and the communities they serve.
These observations are not meant to deny that the gross disparities of wealth in global society today pose a
grave threat to the realization of rights recognized in modern-day customary IHRL. However, we cannot lay
the blame for this systemic injustice at the feet of customary IHRL itself; rather, customary IHRL is a critical
tool to combat it.
Can a Postmodern Doctrine of CIL Based on the “Juridical Conscience of Humankind” Make CIL More Just?
To cure CIL of its proglobal capitalist biases and “help promote the global common good and safeguard our
common humanity,”26 Chimni proposes a “postmodern” doctrine of CIL with certain key features. Among others, he argues for recognition of the “juridical conscience of humankind,” or “opinio juris communis,” in addition to
traditional opinio juris, “in order to inject progressive content into the international legal order.”27
Chimni’s proposal to incorporate the “juridical conscience of humankind” in the identiﬁcation of CIL norms is
welcome and merits serious reﬂection. It implicitly signals the imperative of evaluating CIL norms and their
impacts from an ethical perspective anchored in the idea of a global community of states and peoples. I have similarly argued that the assessment of CIL must be made within an ethical context, and have rejected the pretense that
CIL norms can be made “neutrally” (a process that may be identiﬁed with the notion of “formal” custom to which
Chimni refers), without regard to either the ethics of the process that generates them or the ethical consequences
of the resulting CIL norms.
However, the idea of a “juridical conscience of humankind” is very amorphous. The effort to ascertain the CIL
status of particular norms with serious ethical implications is fraught with difﬁculties, requiring the balancing of
competing ethical concerns (such as, for example, respect for the sovereignty of states regarding the use of their
natural resources, on the one hand, and respect for the global environment, on the other). It is not clear that there
exists a universal conscience among jurists based on a shared conception of the global common good that can
resolve these tensions without additional guidance. It is preferable instead, as I have suggested, to determine the
CIL status of a norm in light of a more sophisticated set of ethical principles, including that of unity in diversity, that
have been explicitly endorsed by states in documents such as the UDHR, and which coincide with many Third
World values, such as cooperation and consultation.
Conclusion
Chimni’s article rightly asks us to look critically at the process of CIL lawmaking and ensure that it adequately
reﬂects the voices of Third World states and peoples. His article legitimately demands, too, that we reevaluate
norms of CIL to ensure they are not the product of bias against the Third World, and do not perpetuate or exacerbate global economic inequality. Chimni makes important proposals to help CIL serve all states and peoples. I
have recommended here a few reﬁnements to his perceptions and proposals.
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